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THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE:
DISTINGUISHING ECONOMIC LOSS FROM
NON-ECONOMIC LOSS
RALPH C. ANZIVINO*
I. INTRODUCTION
When a product fails there are three types of damages that can
result. Those damages are identified by the courts as economic loss
damages, personal injury damages, and non-economic loss damages. In
any given case, there may be one, two, or all three types. It is clear that
when a defective product causes personal injury damages, that case will
generally proceed as a tort case. However, when the defective product
causes economic, non-economic damages, or both, the economic loss
doctrine comes into application.
The economic loss doctrine requires that courts distinguish economic
loss from non-economic loss. Those damages found to be economic loss
can only be recovered through contract law. On the other hand,
damages deemed to be non-economic loss are recoverable through tort
law. In nearly every state, the theories are mutually exclusive.
Therefore, the case can only proceed as a tort or contract case, but not
both. The critical determination is whether the damages involved are
economic or non-economic losses.
Common damage claims that arise from a product's failure include
lost profits, repair or replacement, downtime, overtime, and other
incidental and consequential damages. In the absence of any coincident
property damage, these damages are generally understood to be
economic loss damages recoverable only through contract law. There
are, however, some circumstances where purely economic damages are
recoverable in tort.
When a product fails and causes property damage, determining
whether the damages are economic or non-economic becomes difficult.
Distinctions must be made between damage to the product itself,
damage to the system of which it is a part, and damage to "other
property." There is no consensus rule on how to make such distinctions.
* Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School.
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In addition, even though one may conclude that the damages are non-
economic losses, there are circumstances where the non-economic loss is
recoverable only through contract law. The purpose of this Article is to
distinguish economic loss from non-economic loss and to develop a
workable rule for making the same distinction when a failed product
causes property damage.
II. ECONOMIC Loss
According to the economic loss doctrine, a buyer who purchases a
defective product and suffers "solely economic loss" is required to
recover his damages through contract law, including the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.).' On the other hand, if the product causes
"personal injury" or "other property" damage, then negligence and
strict liability theories are available.2 The nature of the loss incurred
dictates whether the buyer's claim is to be brought in contract or tort.3
Thus, it is essential to be able to distinguish solely "economic loss" from
"personal injury" and "other property" damage. There are a number of
sources available to determine when a defective product causes solely
''economic losses."
A. Uniform Commercial Code
The U.C.C. provides a comprehensive system for compensating
aggrieved buyers for economic loss that arises from the purchase of a
defective product.4  Also, the U.C.C. provides protection for
manufacturers and sellers through limitation of remedies5  and
disclaimers.6 In fact, it is the existence of the U.C.C. that serves as one
of the founding principles for the creation of the economic loss
doctrine.7 Therefore, an examination of the U.C.C. should prove useful
in identifying those damages that are solely economic loss.
A buyer generally purchases a product for its expected performance.
Those performance expectations are often understood as express
1. Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & Risberg, Inc., 148 Wis. 2d 910, 916,
437 N.W.2d 213,215 (1989).
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1 (1998).
3. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 869-71 (1986).
4. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec. Inc., 2004 WI 139, 28, 276 Wis. 2d 361, 28, 688
N.W.2d 462, % 28.
5. U.C.C. § 2-719 (2004); WIS. STAT. § 402.719 (2005-2006).
6. U.C.C. § 2-316 (2004); WIS. STAT. § 402.316.
7. Cease Elec. Inc., 2004 WI 139, 28-31, 276 Wis. 2d 361, 1 28-31, 688 N.W.2d 462,
$ 28-31.
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warranties under the U.C.C.8 Even absent any express warranties, the
U.C.C. provides a merchantability warranty' and, under specified
circumstances, a fitness warranty.'0  In the event any warranty is
breached, the U.C.C. defines the damages as the difference at the time
and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and
the value they would have had if they had been as warranted." A loss of
product value is clearly an economic loss covered by the U.C.C.
In addition to loss of product value, the U.C.C. recognizes other
economic loss damages that are incident to a breach of warranty or
contract. Those "expenses reasonably incurred in the inspection,
receipt, transportation and care and custody" of the defective goods are
economic loss damages incident to the breach.12 Also, any commercially
reasonable expenses incurred in effecting cover 3 are economic loss
expenses incident to the breach. Collectively, these expenses are known
as incidental expenses." These incidental expenses are also economic
loss damages.
The final type of contract damages arising from the sale of a
defective product recognized by the U.C.C. is consequential damages.
Consequential damages can be divided into two types. The first type is
any loss that results from the general or particular requirements of the
buyer that the seller had reason to know at the time of contracting, and
which could not be prevented by cover or otherwise. 5 These damages
are often the lost profits suffered by the buyer because the product did
not meet performance expectations. 6 These damages do not involve
damage to property and are therefore solely economic loss damages.17
The second type of consequential damages can be further divided
into two classes. One class is personal injury that proximately results
8. U.C.C. § 2-313 (2004); WIS. STAT. § 402.313.
9. U.C.C. § 2-314 (2004); WIS. STAT. § 402.314.
10. U.C.C. § 2-315 (2004); WIS. STAT. § 402.315.
11. U.C.C. § 2-714(2) (2004); Wis. STAT. § 402.714(2).
12. U.C.C. § 2-715(1) (2004); WiS. STAT. § 402.715(1).
13. U.C.C. § 2-712 (2004); WIs. STAT. § 402.712.
14. U.C.C. § 2-715(1) (2004); Wis. STAT. § 402.715(1).
15. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (2004); WiS. STAT. § 402.715(2)(a).
16. See Harbor Hill Lithographing Corp. v. Dittler Bros., 348 N.Y.S.2d 920, 923 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1973); Manouchehri v. Heim, 941 P.2d 978, 983 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).
17. Digicorp, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 2003 WI 54, T 69, 262 Wis. 2d 32, 69, 662
N.W.2d 652, $ 69; Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 216 Wis. 2d 395, 406-07, 573
N.W.2d 842, 847 (1998); Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & Risberg, Inc., 148
Wis. 2d 910, 921, 437 N.W.2d 213, 217-18 (1989).
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from any breach of warranty. 18 In the few states that do not recognize
the economic loss doctrine,' 9 the personal injury claim would be a
separate contract claim in addition to a tort claim against the
manufacturer or seller. For example, this first class of consequential
damages has been used as a basis for liability for a defective air
conditioner that caused death, ° a defective machine that caused serious
personal injury," ingested bread that caused illness, 22 and a leaky casket
that caused mental distress.' However, in those states that do recognize
the economic loss doctrine,24 the tort claim precludes the contract claim.
18. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b) (2004); WIS. STAT. § 402.715(2)(b).
19. The Supreme Court of Arkansas has chosen not to adopt the economic loss doctrine.
Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Case Corp., 878 S.W.2d 741, 743 (Ark. 1994); Blagg v. Fred Hunt
Co., 612 S.W.2d 321, 324 (Ark. 1981). Montana has likewise declined to follow the economic
loss doctrine. See Jim's Excavating Serv., Inc., v. HKM Assocs., 878 P.2d 248, 255 (Mont.
1994).
20. Garavalia v. Heat Controller, Inc., 570 N.E.2d 1227, 1229, 1231-32 (I1. App. Ct.
1991).
21. Shaw v. Dauphin Graphic Machs., Inc., 240 F. App'x 177,178-79 (9th Cir. 2007).
22. Wisniewski v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 323 A.2d 744, 746-47 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974).
23. Hirst v. Elgin Metal Casket Co., 438 F. Supp. 906, 907-08 (D. Mont. 1977).
24. ALABAMA: Lloyd Wood Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 543 So. 2d 671, 672-74
(Ala. 1989). ALASKA: Pratt & Whitney Can., Inc. v. Sheehan, 852 P.2d 1173, 1177 (Alaska
1993); St. Denis v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 900 F. Supp. 1194, 1200 (D. Alaska 1995).
ARIZONA: Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 694 P.2d 198, 209 (Ariz. 1984); Carstens v. City of Phoenix, 75 P.3d 1081, 1084 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2003); Apollo Group, Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 58 F.3d 477, 479-80 (9th Cir. 1995).
CALIFORNIA: Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., 102 P.3d 268, 272-74 (Cal. 2004).
COLORADO: A.C. Excavating v. Yacht Club II Homeowners Ass'n, 114 P.3d 862, 865
(Colo. 2005); Town of Alma v. Azco Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1264-65 (Colo. 2000).
CONNECTICUT: CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-572m to 52-572n (2005); Flagg Energy Dev.
Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 709 A.2d 1075, 1088 (Conn. 1998) (applying principles of the
economic loss doctrine in products liability case). But see Paliwoda v. Mathews, No.
CV020398249S, 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3088, at *16 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 16, 2006)
(noting the split in authority in lower courts with regard to the meaning of Flagg).
DELAWARE: Danforth v. Acorn Structures, Inc., 608 A.2d 1194, 1198 (Del. 1992).
FLORIDA: Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 891 So. 2d 532, 536 (Fla. 2004).
GEORGIA: Gen. Elec. Co. v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., 608 S.E.2d 636, 638 (Ga. 2005).
HAWAII: City Express, Inc. v. Express Partners, 959 P.2d 836, 839 (Haw. 1998); State v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 919 P.2d 294, 302 (Haw. 1996). IDAHO: Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 108
P.3d 996, 1000 (Idaho 2005). ILLINOIS: First Midwest Bank, N.A. v. Stewart Title Guar.
Co., 843 N.E.2d 327, 333-34 (I11. 2006); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443,
450-51 (Ill. 1982). INDIANA: Gunkel v. Renovations, Inc., 822 N.E.2d 150, 152 (Ind. 2005).
IOWA: Determan v. Johnson, 613 N.W.2d 259, 261-62 (Iowa 2000). KANSAS: Prendiville v.
Contemporary Homes, Inc., 83 P.3d 1257, 1260 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004); Full Faith Church of
Love W., Inc. v. Hoover Treated Wood Prods., Inc., 224 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1289 (D. Kan.
2002) (predicting the Kansas Supreme Court would agree with the Kansas Court of Appeals
and endorse the economic loss doctrine). KENTUCKY: Presnell Constr. Managers, Inc. v.
EH Constr., LLC, 134 S.W.3d 575, 583 (Ky. 2004) (Keller, J. concurring) (stating that the
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court should explicitly adopt the economic loss doctrine); Mt. Lebanon Pers. Care Home, Inc.
v. Hoover Universal, Inc., 276 F.3d 845, 849 (6th Cir. 2002) (predicting "the Kentucky
Supreme Court would apply the economic loss doctrine to business purchases"). MAINE:
Oceanside at Pine Point Condo. Owners Ass'n v. Peachtree Doors, Inc., 659 A.2d 267, 270
(Me. 1995). MARYLAND: Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 667 A.2d 624, 631 (Md.
1995). MASSACHUSETTS: Berish v. Bornstein, 770 N.E.2d 961, 975 (Mass. 2002).
MICHIGAN: Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612, 615 (Mich. 1992).
MINNESOTA: MINN. STAT. § 604.10 (2000). MISSISSIPPI: Progressive Ins. Co. v. Monaco
Coach Corp., No. l:05CV37-DMR-JMR, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21251, at *5 (S.D. Miss. Mar.
29, 2006); E. Miss. Elec. Power Ass'n v. Porcelain Prods. Co., 729 F. Supp. 512, 514 (S.D.
Miss. 1990) (predicting that the Mississippi Supreme Court would not allow recovery of solely
economic losses stemming from a defective product in tort); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Ford Motor Co., 736 So. 2d 384, 387 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). MISSOURI: Sharp Bros.
Contracting Co. v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 703 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Mo. 1986); Self v. Equilon
Enters., LLC, No. 4:00CV1903 TIA, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17288, at *40 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 30,
2005). NEBRASKA: Nat'l Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 332 N.W.2d 39, 43 (Neb.
1983). NEVADA: Calloway v. City of Reno, 993 P.2d 1259, 1266 (Nev. 2000), rev'd on other
grounds, Olson v. Richard, 89 P.3d 31, 33 (Nev. 2004). NEW HAMPSHIRE: Kelleher v.
Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 891 A.2d 477, 495 (N.H. 2005). NEW JERSEY: Alloway v.
Gen. Marine Indus., L.P., 695 A.2d 264, 275 (N.J. 1997). NEW MEXICO: Amrep Sw., Inc. v.
Shollenbarger Wood Treating, Inc. (In re Consol. Vista Hills Retaining Wall Litig.), 893 P.2d
438, 445-47 (N.M. 1995). NEW YORK: Bocre Leasing Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 645
N.E.2d 1195, 1196-99 (N.Y. 1995). NORTH CAROLINA: Moore v. Coachmen Indus., Inc.,
499 S.E.2d 772, 780 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998). NORTH DAKOTA: Steiner v. Ford Motor Co.,
606 N.W.2d 881, 885 (N.D. 2000). OHIO: Corporex Dev. & Constr. Mgmt., Inc. v. Shook,
Inc., 835 N.E.2d 701, 704 (Ohio 2005). OKLAHOMA: Dutsch v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 845
P.2d 187, 193 (Okla. 1992); Waggoner v. Town & Country Mobile Homes, Inc., 808 P.2d 649,
653 (Okla. 1990); United Golf, LLC v. Westlake Chem. Corp., No. 05-CV-0495-CVE-PJC,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57531, at *7 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 15, 2006). OREGON: Or. Steel Mills,
Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, LLP, 83 P.3d 322, 328 (Or. 2004); Onita Pac. Corp. v. Trs. of
Bronson, 843 P.2d 890, 896-97 (Or. 1992); Hale v. Groce, 744 P.2d 1289, 1290 (Or. 1987);
Harris v. Suniga, 149 P.3d 224, 227 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). PENNSYLVANIA: Bilt-Rite
Contractors, Inc. v. Architectural Studio, 866 A.2d 270, 286-87 (Pa. 2005). RHODE
ISLAND: Rousseau v. K.N. Constr., Inc., 727 A.2d 190, 193 (R.I. 1999) (holding economic
loss rule is inapplicable to consumer transactions); Boston Inv. Prop. No. 1 State v. E.W.
Burman, Inc., 658 A.2d 515, 518 (R.I. 1995). SOUTH CAROLINA: Tommy L. Griffin
Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones & Goulding, Inc., 463 S.E.2d 85, 88 (S.C. 1995).
SOUTH DAKOTA: Diamond Surface, Inc. v. State Cement Plant Comm'n, 583 N.W.2d 155,
161-62 (S.D. 1998). TENNESSEE: Messer Griesheim Indus., Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 194
S.W.3d 466, 471-72 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); Trinity Indus., Inc. v. McKinnon Bridge Co., 77
S.W.3d 159, 173 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). TEXAS: Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio
Eng'rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 45 (Tex. 1998). UTAH: Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48
P.3d 235, 240 (Utah 2002). VERMONT: Hamill v. Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Co., 892 A.2d 226,
229 (Vt. 2005). VIRGINIA: Filak v. George, 594 S.E.2d 610, 613 (Va. 2004).
WASHINGTON: Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 881 P.2d 986,
990 (Wash. 1994); Alejandre v. Bull, 98 P.3d 844, 852 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004); Reynolds Metals
Co. v. Alcan Inc., No. C04-0175RJB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29033, at *8-9 (W.D. Wash. May
1, 2006). WEST VIRGINIA: Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E.2d 576, 589 (W. Va. 2000).
WISCONSIN: 1325 N. Van Buren, LLC v. T-3 Group, Ltd., 2006 WI 94, 9j 5, 293 Wis. 2d 410,
T 5, 716 N.W.2d 822, 5. WYOMING: D & D Transp., Ltd. v. Interline Energy Servs., Inc.,
117 P.3d 423,427 (Wyo. 2005).
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This is the case in Wisconsin.25 Thus, the first class of consequential
damages specified in Article 2 is not actionable in states like Wisconsin
that have adopted the economic loss doctrine.
The second class of the second type of consequential damages
specified in the U.C.C. is injury to property proximately resulting from
any breach of warranty.26 The range of U.C.C. cases that are included in
this second class is very broad. There are essentially three categories of
cases that are recognized as injury to property. The first category
consists of those cases where the defective product injures only itself.
An example is a defective mobile home that has repeated ceiling
condensation problems." The second category consists of those cases
where the defective product is a component part of an integrated
system. 8 Examples of the second category would be a defective water
meter that damages the building,29  a defective ingredient that
contaminates the finished product,' or kitchen cabinets that contain a
high level of formaldehyde that damages the home.31 The third category
encompasses those cases where the defective product goes beyond
damaging itself or the system of which it is a component, to damaging
"other property." Examples of the third category are a mobile home
with defective wiring that burns down and destroys all the personal
property in the mobile home,32 contaminated hay that kills the horses
that ingested the hay,33 a mobile home that leaks and damages personal
property within the home,34 or a driveway sealer that damages the
driveway it is placed upon.35 This third category is the crossover group
of cases that would appear to be covered by both the U.C.C. and strict
tort.36 In those few jurisdictions that have not adopted the economic loss
25. Austin v. Ford Motor Co., 86 Wis. 2d 628, 644-45, 273 N.W.2d 233, 240 (1979).
26. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b) (2004); WIS. STAT. § 402.715(2)(b) (2005-2006).
27. See Waggoner v. Town & Country Mobile Homes, Inc., 808 P.2d 649 (Okla. 1990).
28. See infra Part II.B.
29. See Fed. Ins. Co. v. Vill. of Westmont, 649 N.E.2d 986, 987 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
30. See Blommer Chocolate Co. v. Bongards Creameries, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 234, 234
(N.D. I11. 1986).
31. See Marsh Furniture Co. v. Pa. Mfrs. Ass'n Ins. Co., No. 02A01-9505-CV-00103, 1996
Tenn. App. LEXIS 367, at *10-11 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 17, 1996).
32. See Doty v. Parkway Homes Co., 368 S.E.2d 670, 671 (S.C. 1988).
33. See Rothing v. Kallestad, 159 P.3d 222, 223 (Mont. 2007).
34. See Lidstrand v. Silvercrest Indus., 623 P.2d 710 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981).
35. See Bazant v. Farmers Union Oil Co., No. BDV-95-041, 1996 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 52,
at *1-3 (D. Mont. Dec. 19, 1996).
36. Strict tort applies where a defective product causes personal injury or property
damage to some third person. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) and
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1 (1998).
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doctrine, the two bodies of law do overlap so that a plaintiff can
coincidently pursue both theories. The preceding cases in the second
and third categories illustrate the potential overlapping of U.C.C. and
strict tort claims. In most jurisdictions, however, the claims are mutually
exclusive and the court must determine if the property damage is
economic or non-economic loss.
An examination of the U.C.C. is helpful in identifying at least three
types of losses that qualify as economic loss. The first is the loss of
product value when a product does not perform as warranted. The
second is any incidental expense associated with the product's failure to
perform as warranted, and the third is consequential damage that is
foreseeable but not the result of any property damage. The U.C.C.,
however, does not provide any basis to distinguish economic loss from
non-economic loss when the defective product causes property damage.
B. Restatement (Third) of Torts and the Integrated System Rule
The Restatement (Third) of Torts is the most recent pronouncement
on a manufacturer/seller's responsibility for the harm caused by its
defective product. Obviously, the focus of the Restatement of Torts is
to identify those circumstances where a defective product causes harm
that can be recovered through tort theories. Necessarily, therefore, the
Restatement seeks to distinguish economic loss from non-economic loss.
The Restatement defines a product as "tangible personal property
distributed commercially for use or consumption., 37 Other items such as
real estate can also be considered a product when the context of their
use is analogous to the use of tangible personal property.38 The
Restatement's definition of a "product" is consistent with the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's definition of the term.39
The Restatement (Third) of Torts provides that when a defective
product causes solely economic loss, the damage claim is to be resolved
37. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 19(a) (1998).
38. Id.
39. A cement paver, see generally Wausau Tile, Inc. v. County Concrete Corp., 226 Wis.
2d 235, 593 N.W.2d 445 (1999); a milk product, see generally Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 2005
WI 112, 283 Wis. 2d 511, 699 N.W.2d 167; a machine, see generally Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v.
Cedarapids, Inc., 216 Wis. 2d 395, 573 N.W.2d 842 (1998); a home, see generally Linden v.
Cascade Stone Co., 2005 WI 113, 283 Wis. 2d 606, 699 N.W.2d 189; and a forty-two-unit
condominium complex, see generally 1325 N. Van Buren, LLC v. T-3 Group, Ltd., 2006 WI
94, 293 Wis. 2d 410, 716 N.W.2d 822, have all been held to be "products" by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court.
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by following contract law and the U.C.C.4 The Restatement (Third) of
Torts identifies a number of circumstances that constitute solely
economic loss. The simplest are the losses that ensue when the product
harms only itself.4' These losses take two forms.42 The first is the repair
or replacement costs associated with the defective product.4'3  The
second is consequential losses that do not involve harm to the buyer's
person or property.44 An example of the second form would be lost
profits caused by the defective product. The Restatement (Third) of
Torts illustration of this second form is a defective conveyor belt that
shuts down the buyer's assembly line and causes a disruption in the
buyer's production schedule.4 ' The interruption in the buyer's
production schedule causes lost profits that are solely economic loss
damages. These losses that occur when the defective product damages
only itself under the Restatement are consistent with the U.C.C.'s
definition of economic loss.
The issue, however, becomes more complex when the defective
product causes physical harm beyond itself to surrounding property.
The damage caused by the defective product to any surrounding
property is clearly "other property" damage. 6 It is property damage to
property "other than" itself. There are, however, two types of damage
to "other property." The first type is when the defective product is a
component part of a machine or system and the defective product
damages the machine or system. The surrounding property that is
damaged is limited to the machine or the system of which the defective
product is a part. This type of damage is considered to be damage to the
product itself.47 As such, these damages are not considered to be
damage to "other property," but solely economic loss. This principle is
known as the integrated system rule." There are a number of rationales
for the rule. First, the deterrent value of tort liability is not needed
when the damage is to the product itself or its integrated system. 9
40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. a (1998).
41. Id.
42. Id. § 21 cmt. d.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. § 21 cmt. d, illus. 3.
46. Id. § 21 cmt. e.
47. Id.
48. See id.; see also Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 2005 WI 112, 27, 283 Wis. 2d 511, 27,
699 N.W.2d 167, T 27.
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21, Reporters Notes (1998).
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Second, damages to the product itself or its integrated system are
foreseeable damages and, as such, are the type of losses that contracting
parties are expected to address through their contract."0 And, finally,
because all but the very simplest machines have component parts, a
contrary holding would require a finding of "other property" damage in
virtually every case where a product damages itself.
The Restatement (Third) of Torts illustrates the integrated system
rule with a hypothetical." A company purchases a conveyor belt that is
installed in its assembly line. 3 The defective belt subsequently breaks,
damaging the assembly line. 4  All the losses stemming from the
defective belt are considered to be damage to the product itself.55 As
such, all the damages are purely economic losses, not "other property"
damages. The net effect of such a rule is to broaden the coverage of the
economic loss doctrine and convert otherwise "other property" damage
into economic loss. The integrated system rule covers the first type of
"other property" damage that can arise when a defective product
damages its surrounding property.
The second type of "other property" damage is damage to
surrounding property that is more than damage to the product or its
integrated system.56  This second type of damage is clearly "other
property" damage that triggers tort liability. 7 The Restatement (Third)
of Torts also illustrates this type of damage with a hypothetical.58 A
company has an assembly line at its plant.59 A defective steering
mechanism in the company's forklift causes the forklift to go out of
control and damage the assembly line.60 The damages stemming from
the defective forklift are considered to be "other property" damage
actionable through tort theories.6'  Because the defective steering
mechanism caused damage beyond the forklift to the assembly line, the
50. Id.
51. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 867 (1986);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. e (1998).
52. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. d, illus. 3 (1998).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. § 21 cmt. e.
57. Id.
58. Id. § 21 cmt. e, illus. 4.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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integrated system rule is not applicable.62 The damages are non-
economic losses recoverable through tort theories.
The integrated system rule was created by the United States
Supreme Court in East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval
Inc.6 3 In East River, defective valves damaged the ship's turbine which
in turn damaged the propulsion system.64 The Court found only
economic loss damages and not damage to "other property."65  Most
states since East River have adopted the integrated system rule.
66
62. See id.
63. See 476 U.S. 858, 871-72 (1986).
64. Id. at 860-61.
65. Id. at 875-76.
66. ALABAMA: Carrell v. Masonite Corp., 775 So. 2d 121,126 (Ala. 2000) (Johnstone,
J., concurring) (suggesting that the economic loss doctrine should not apply when damage
occurs to the home rather than just a component of the home). ALASKA: N. Power & Eng'g
Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324, 330 (Alaska 1981). ARIZONA: Arrow
Leasing Corp. v. Cummins Ariz. Diesel, Inc., 666 P.2d 544, 548-49 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
CALIFORNIA: Jimenez v. Superior Ct., 58 P.3d 450, 458 (Cal. 2002) (Kennard, J.,
concurring) (clarifying that economic loss depends on whether the component part is "so
integrated into the overall unit" that the part loses its own identity). DELAWARE:
Delmarva Power & Light v. Meter-Treater Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 564, 569-70 (D. Del. 2002)
(applying Delaware law). FLORIDA: Casa Clara Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Charley Toppino &
Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244, 1247 (Fla. 1993). GEORGIA: Flintkote Co. v. Dravo Corp., 678
F.2d 942, 951 (11th Cir. 1982) (applying Georgia law). HAWAII: Va. Sur. Co. v. Am.
Eurocopter Corp., 955 F. Supp. 1213, 1216 (D. Haw. 1996) (citing E. River S.S. Corp. v.
Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 867 (1986)) (predicting Hawaii law and holding that
helicopter engine, fitting, and helicopter are all one product for purposes of the economic loss
doctrine). IDAHO: Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 108 P.3d 996, 1000-01 (Idaho 2005).
ILLINOIS: Trans State Airlines v. Pratt & Whitney Can., Inc., 682 N.E.2d 45, 58-59 (Ill.
1997). INDIANA: Progressive Ins. Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 749 N.E.2d 484, 490 (Ind.
2001) (agreeing that component parts of a product are not "other property," but rather one
product). IOWA: Richards v. Midland Brick Sales Co., 551 N.W.2d 649, 650-51 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1996). KANSAS: Nw. Ark. Masonry, Inc. v. Summit Specialty Prods, Inc., 31 P.3d 982,
988 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001). LOUISIANA: ERA Helicopters, Inc. v. Bell Helicopter Textron,
Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1096, 1097-98 (E.D. La. 1987) (applying Louisiana law). MAINE:
Oceanside at Pine Point Condo. Owners Ass'n v. Peachtree Doors, Inc., 659 A.2d 267, 271
(Me. 1995). MARYLAND: Pulte Home Corp. v. Parex, Inc., 923 A.2d 971, 1004-05 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2007). MASSACHUSETTS: Superior Kitchen Designs, Inc. v. Valspar Indus.
(U.S.A.), Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 140, 145-46 (D. Mass. 2003) (applying Massachusetts law).
MICHIGAN: Sullivan Indus., Inc. v. Double Seal Glass Co., 480 N.W.2d 623, 629-30 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1991). MINNESOTA: Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assocs.
Architects, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 816, 819-21 (Minn. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Hapka
v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990). MISSISSIPPI: State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 736 So. 2d 384, 388 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). MISSOURI: Rockport
Pharmacy., Inc. v. Digital Simplistics, Inc., 53 F.3d 195, 198-99 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying
Missouri law). NEVADA: Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Pratt & Whitney
Can., Inc., 815 P.2d 601, 604 (Nev. 1991). NEW HAMPSHIRE: Lockheed Martin Corp. v.
RFI Supply, Inc., 440 F.3d 549, 555 (1st Cir. 2006) (applying New Hampshire law). NEW
YORK: AKV Auto Transp., Inc. v. Syosset Truck Sales, Inc., 806 N.Y.S.2d 254, 256 (N.Y.
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Wisconsin adopted the integrated system rule in Wausau Tile, Inc. v.
County Concrete Corp.67 In Wausau Tile, Wausau Tile manufactured
and sold pavers to distributors. 68 Pavers are concrete blocks, primarily
used for exterior walkways, and are "made of cement, aggregate, water,
and other materials." 69  Wausau Tile had contracted with several
suppliers to supply the cement and aggregate to make the pavers."
Subsequently, it was learned that because of the high alkalinity levels in
the cement and aggregate, the pavers suffered various problems,
including buckling, excessive expansion, curling, and cracking." As a
result, Wausau Tile had to pay damages consisting of (1) repair and
replacement of defective pavers; (2) claims paid by their distributors for
personal injury and property damage suffered by their distributors'
customers; and (3) its distributors' lost profits and loss of future
business.72 The issue was whether the defective components-cement
and aggregate-caused damage that fell within the integrated system
rule.73 The Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted the integrated system
rule and held that the aggregate, cement, and pavers were all part of one
product.7" Thus, the damages were solely economic loss. Therefore,
contract principles, not tort principles, would control resolution of the
App. Div. 2005). NORTH CAROLINA: Atl. Coast Mech., Inc. v. Arcadis, Geraghty &
Miller of N.C., Inc., 623 S.E.2d 334, 340 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006). NORTH DAKOTA: Coop.
Power Ass'n v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 493 N.W.2d 661, 667 (N.D. 1992). OHIO: HDM
Flugservice GMBH v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 332 F.3d 1025, 1031 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying
Ohio law). PENNSYLVANIA: King v. Hilton-Davis, 855 F.2d 1047, 1050-53 (3d Cir. 1988)
(predicting Pennsylvania law). SOUTH CAROLINA: Laurens Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Altec
Indus., Inc., 889 F.2d 1323, 1324-25 (4th Cir. 1989) (predicting South Carolina law). SOUTH
DAKOTA: City of Lennox v. Mitek Indus., Inc., 519 N.W.2d 330, 333-34 (S.D. 1994).
TENNESSEE: Messer Griesheim Indus., Inc. v. Cryotech of Kingsport, Inc., 131 S.W.3d 457,
466 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (considering whether product in question is part of an integrated
package for purposes of economic loss). TEXAS: Alcan Aluminum Corp. v. BASF Corp.,
133 F. Supp. 2d 482, 505 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (predicting Texas law). UTAH: Am. Towers
Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mech., Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1191 (Utah 1996). VERMONT: Moffitt v.
Icynene, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 2d 591, 601 (D. Vt. 2005) (applying Vermont law). VIRGINA:
Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neale, Architects, Inc., 374 S.E.2d 55, 57-58 (Va. 1988).
WISCONSIN: Wausau Tile, Inc. v. County Concrete Corp., 226 Wis. 2d 235, 249-50, 593
N.W.2d 445, 452 (1999). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21, Reporters
Notes (1998).
67. 226 Wis. 2d at 249-50, 593 N.W.2d at 452 (1999).
68. Id. at 241, 593 N.W.2d at 449.
69. Id. at 241, 593 N.W.2d at 449.
70. Id. at 241, 593 N.W.2d at 449.
71. Id. at 242, 593 N.W.2d at 449.
72. Id. at 248, 593 N.W.2d at 452.
73. Id. at 251, 593 N.W.2d at 452.
74. Id. at 251, 593 N.W.2d at 453.
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dispute.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the integrated
system rule in Linden v. Cascade Stone Co.75 In Linden, homeowners
contracted for the construction of a new home.76 After construction was
complete, the home suffered water infiltration through its exterior walls
and roof." The water infiltration caused deterioration to the home,
mold, and deficient air quality in the home.78 The homeowners sought
to use tort theories to recover their losses incurred in remedying the
problems caused by the poor construction. 9 The court concluded that
because the defective walls and roof harmed only other components of
the house, the integrated system rule was applicable.' ° The losses were
held to be solely economic loss, not "other property" damage, and
81
therefore, only contract principles were available to the homeowners.
The essence of the integrated system rule is that if the defective product
at issue is a defective component in a larger system, the other
components of the system are not regarded as "other property" as a
legal matter even if they are different property in a literal sense.'
The Restatement (Third) of Torts is primarily concerned with
defective products that cause personal injury and property damage. It,
therefore, does not address loss of product value as economic loss.
However, the Restatement (Third) of Torts does concur with the U.C.C.
that damage to only the product itself constitutes solely economic loss.
The losses identified by the Restatement (Third) of Torts are repair and
replacement costs for the product and consequential damages that occur
in the absence of any property damage. However, the Restatement
(Third) of Torts adds an additional element of economic loss through
the integrated system rule. The rule provides that any damage to a
system of which the defective product is a part is also considered to be
damage to the product only, and thus, economic loss.
75. 2005 WI 113, 32, 283 Wis. 2d 606, 32, 699 N.W.2d 189, T 32.
76. Id. 2, 283 Wis. 2d 606, 2, 699 N.W.2d 189, 2.
77. Id. 3, 283 Wis. 2d 606, 3, 699 N.W.2d 189, 3.
78. Id. 3, 283 Wis. 2d 606, 3, 699 N.W.2d 189, 3.
79. Id. 3, 283 Wis. 2d 606, 3, 699 N.W.2d 189, 3.
80. Id. 29, 283 Wis. 2d 606, 29, 699 N.W.2d 189, 29.
81. Id. 29, 283 Wis. 2d 606, 29, 699 N.W.2d 189, 29.
82. Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 2005 WI 112, 27,283 Wis. 2d 511, 27, 699 N.W.2d 167,
1 27.
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C. Case Law Defining Economic Loss
1. Economic Loss Recoverable Through Contract Law
There are a number of landmark decisions by various supreme
courts that collectively define those losses that constitute economic loss
covered by the economic loss doctrine. These cases can generally be
classified into two groups. The first group consists of cases where there
is loss of product value and coincident consequential damages. In
Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & Risberg, Inc., a buyer
purchased grading equipment that was defective.83 The buyer sought
damages for replacement parts, labor charges, downtime, repair costs,
and lost profits. 4  All the damages were held to be solely economic
losses. 8  In Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., a buyer
purchased a rock crusher that subsequently failed.86 The buyer suffered
repair costs and lost revenue. 87 The court held such losses to be
economic loss recoverable only in a contract action.8' Finally, in
Digicorp, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., a distributor of telephone calling
services sued a telecommunications provider for fraud and breach of
contract. 9 The plaintiff sought damages in the form of lost profits. 9°
The court held the lost profits were solely economic loss damages and
there were no damages in the form of personal injury or "other property
damage." 9' The allegations of fraud were not sufficient to raise a tort
claim. 9
The second group of cases defining economic loss consists of cases
where the defective product damages itself or its integrated system. In
Seely v. White Motor Co., a buyer purchased a truck from the seller for
use in the buyer's hauling business.93 The truck had a defective brake
system that subsequently caused an accident.94 The only physical
83. 148 Wis. 2d 910, 914, 437 N.W.2d 213, 214-15 (1989).
84. Id. at 914-15, 437 N.W.2d at 215.
85. Id. at 921, 437 N.W.2d at 217-18.
86. 216 Wis. 2d 395, 398, 573 N.W.2d 842, 844 (1998).
87. Id. at 398-99, 573 N.W.2d at 844.
88. Id. at 406-07, 573 N.W.2d at 847.
89. 2003 WI 54, 1, 262 Wis. 2d 32, 1, 662 N.W.2d 652, 1.
90. See id. 12, 14,262 Wis. 2d 32, $1 12, 14, 662 N.W.2d 652, $ 12, 14.
91. See id. 68-69, 262 Wis. 2d 32, 68-69, 662 N.W.2d 652, $ 68-69.
92. See id. 62, 262 Wis. 2d 32, 62, 662 N.W.2d 652, $ 62.
93. 403 P.2d 145, 147 (Cal. 1965).
94. Id.
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damage in the accident was to the truck. 95 The buyer sought damages
for the repair of the truck and lost profits caused by the loss of its use.96
The California Supreme Court held that such damages were solely
economic loss and recoverable only through contract theory. 97 In East
River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., a buyer purchased
four supertankers.98 Upon taking possession of the ships, the buyer
discovered the tankers had defective turbines, which damaged the
propulsion systems of the tankers. 99 The buyer sought damages from
the seller for the cost to repair the turbines and the lost profits for the
time the tankers were out of service."O The United States Supreme
Court ruled that the turbines were part of an integrated system (the
tanker), and thus, the damages suffered were solely economic loss.'01
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has decided many economic loss
cases. In Wausau Tile, Inc. v. County Concrete Corp., a manufacturer of
concrete paving blocks brought an action against a cement supplier for
supplying defective concrete that was used in manufacturing the cement
pavers. 2 Wausau Tile suffered three types of damages: (1) the cost to
repair and replace the defective pavers; (2) the cost of satisfying third
party claims that the defective pavers caused personal injury and
property damage; and (3) lost profits. 3 The court reasoned that the
defective cement was a component of the final product (the paver) and
as such the damages arose from a defective component of an integrated
system.' 4 Thus, the court held that all the damages were to the product
itself.'° All three types of damages were held to be economic loss
damages. l 6 In General Casualty Co. of Wisconsin v. Ford Motor Co., a
buyer purchased an automobile that contained a defective steering
column."'O The defective steering column caused a fire that destroyed
the automobile."° The supreme court concluded that the loss was solely
95. Id.
96. Id. at 150.
97. See id.
98. 475 U.S. 858, 859 (1986).
99. Id. at 860-61.
100. Id. at 861.
101. Id. at 867.
102. 226 Wis. 2d 235, 241-42, 593 N.W.2d 445, 449 (1999).
103. Id. at 248, 593 N.W.2d at 452.
104. Id. at 257, 593 N.W.2d at 453.
105. Id. at 257, 593 N.W.2d at 453.
106. Id. at 248, 265, 593 N.W.2d at 452, 459.
107. 225 Wis. 2d 353, 355, 592 N.W.2d 198, 199 (1999).
108. Id. at 355, 592 N.W.2d at 199.
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an economic loss.'°9 In Linden v. Cascade Stone Co., a new home owner
sought damages from his contractor and subcontractors for water
infiltration into his newly constructed home. '10  In particular, the
exterior walls and roof were defective. The court held that the damage
to the walls and foundation fell under the integrated system rule and
thus were solely economic loss."' Finally, in 1325 North Van Buren
LLC v. T-3 Group Ltd., an owner of an industrial warehouse contracted
with a builder to convert the warehouse into a forty-two-unit
condominium. 112 There were numerous construction defects and delays
in the project. "3 The court concluded that all the owner's losses were
solely economic losses."4
2. Economic Loss Recoverable Through Tort Law
Economic losses are generally recoverable only through contract
law, not tort. There are, however, two circumstances where solely
economic losses are recoverable in tort.
a. The Fraud Exception to the Economic Loss Doctrine
On occasion, a contract for the sale of a product is the result of
fraudulent inducements by the seller. The damages suffered by the
buyer are solely economic losses, such as loss of product value, lost
profits, downtime, repair and replacement costs, or other similar
damages. There is no property damage caused by the defective product.
States have taken a number of approaches when addressing the problem
of the fraudulently induced contract that causes solely economic loss."5
One approach is to ignore the fraud and treat the matter solely under
contract law."16 The second approach is to permit the aggrieved party to
sue in tort in all cases where the contract is fraudulently induced."7 The
third approach is to permit tort recovery only in those circumstances
where the fraud is considered extraneous to the contract, as opposed to
109. Id. at 361, 592 N.W.2d at 201.
110. 2005 WI 113, T[ 3,283 Wis. 2d 606, 91 3,699 N.W.2d 189, 3.
111. Id. 32,283 Wis. 2d 606, 132, 699 N.W.2d 189, J 32.
112. 2006 WI 94, 2, 293 Wis. 2d 410, 2, 716 N.W.2d 822, T1 2.
113. Id. T 2, 293 Wis. 2d 410, 1 2, 716 N.W.2d 822, 2.
114. Id. 5, 293 Wis. 2d 410, 5, 716 N.W.2d 822, 5.
115. Ralph C. Anzivino, The Fraud in the Inducement Exception to the Economic Loss
Doctrine, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 921, 931 (2007).
116. Id.
117. Id.
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intrinsic to the contract."8
Wisconsin adopted the third approach in Kaloti Enterprises, Inc. v.
Kellogg Sales Co."9  In Kaloti, a food wholesaler sued a cereal
manufacturing company for damages incurred as a result of the failure
of the cereal company to disclose to the wholesaler a change in the
manufacturer's marketing strategy.2 ° The cereal manufacturer had
decided to market its products directly to supermarkets as opposed to its
past practice, which was to sell to the wholesaler who in turn sold to
supermarkets.12' The manufacturer never disclosed its change in
marketing strategy when the wholesaler purchased a large quantity of
the manufacturer's products for resale to supermarkets. 22 In essence,
both the manufacturer and wholesaler would be competing for the same
sales to supermarkets. The court concluded that the losses suffered by
the wholesaler in not being able to resell the purchased products were
solely economic loss damages. 123 Next, the court considered whether the
manufacturer had a duty to disclose its change in marketing strategy to
the wholesaler prior to the wholesaler's large purchase.2 4  The court
held that the manufacturer had a duty to disclose, and the
manufacturer's failure to do so was fraud.'25  Finally, the court
considered whether the fraud would warrant an action in tort, or
whether the buyer's remedy was solely in contract for the economic loss
damages. 12 The court chose to adopt the minority view 27 that permits a
tort action only when the fraud is extraneous to the contract.
128
Extraneous fraud is fraud that concerns matters whose risk and
responsibility do not relate to the quality or character of the goods for
which the parties contracted, or otherwise involves performance under
the contract. 2 9 The court concluded that the economic loss damages
were recoverable in tort because the manufacturer's fraud in not
disclosing the change in its marketing strategy constituted extraneous
118. Id. at 933.
119. 2005 WI 111, 1 42, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 42, 699 N.W.2d 205, 42.
120. Id. 9, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 9, 699 N.W.2d 205, 9.
121. Id. 1 5, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 5, 699 N.W.2d 205, 5.
122. Id. 1$ 5-6, 283 Wis. 2d 555, [ 5-6, 699 N.W.2d 205, T 5-6.
123. Id. 27, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 27, 699 N.W.2d 205, 27.
124. Id. 1[ 14, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 14, 699 N.W.2d 205, $ 14.
125. Id. 22, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 22,699 N.W.2d 205, 22.
126. See id. % 30, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 1 30, 699 N.W.2d 205, T[ 30.
127. See Anzivino, supra note 115, at 921, 931-34.
128. Kaloti, 2005 WI 111, 42,283 Wis. 2d 555, 1 42,699 N.W.2d 205, 1 42.
129. Id. 91 48, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 91 48, 699 N.W.2d 205, 1 48.
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fraud. "S0
Similarly, in Wickenhauser v. Lehtinen, a debtor borrowed money
from a creditor to purchase land.13 As part of the loan transaction, the
creditor fraudulently induced the debtor to execute an option to
purchase the land in favor of the creditor. 3 2 In subsequent litigation
between the parties, the debtor sought damages for the creditor's
fraudulent conduct in connection with the loan transaction. 33 The court
characterized the damages as purely economic losses, but because the
fraud was considered extraneous to the contract, the court permitted the
plaintiff to proceed in tort law.134
b. The Intrinsically Dangerous Substance Exception to the Economic
Loss Doctrine
In addition to fraud, there is one other circumstance where a tort
remedy is available despite the fact that a defective product caused
solely economic loss. That circumstance is when a product contains an
intrinsically dangerous substance. In Northridge Co. v. W.R. Grace &
Co., a property owner brought an action for damages suffered as a result
of the defendant installing a fireproofing product that contained
asbestos in the owner's shopping center.'35 The damages were to cover
the costs of asbestos removal and the drop in value of the property.
3 6
The court held that the product could be found to have damaged
property other than the product itself.'37 Interpreted as such, the
damages would constitute physical harm to "other property," namely
the contamination of the building with asbestos, which posed a health
hazard. 38  The Northridge decision, however, was before the court's
decision in Wausau Tile, which adopted the integrated system rule in
Wisconsin. 39 The integrated system rule provides that when a product
harms the system of which it is a part, it harms only itself, and thus the
damages are solely economic loss. Therefore, under the integrated
130. Id. 51, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 51, 699 N.W.2d 205, T 51.
131. 2007 WI 82, 4, 302 Wis. 2d 41, T 4, 734 N.W.2d 855, $ 4.
132. See id. $ 5, 302 Wis. 2d 41, 5, 734 N.W.2d 855, 5.
133. Id. 7, 302 Wis. 2d 41, % 7, 734 N.W.2d 855, j1 7.
134. Id. 41, 302 Wis. 2d 41, 1 41, 734 N.W.2d 855, 1 41.
135. 162 Wis. 2d 918, 922, 471 N.W.2d 179, 180 (1991).
136. Id. at 922, 471 N.W.2d at 180.
137. Id. at 937, 471 N.W.2d at 186.
138. Id. at 923, 471 N.W.2d at 180.
139. Wausau Tile, Inc. v. County Concrete Corp., 226 Wis. 2d 235, 251, 593 N.W.2d 445,
453 (1999).
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system rule, the fireproofing material in Northridge damaged the
building of which it was a part; thus, the damages would likely be solely
economic loss. There is, however, an alternative understanding of
Northridge. Because asbestos is an intrinsically dangerous substance
that threatens public safety,1' ° the court allowed the plaintiff to pursue
his tort remedies despite the fact that the harm was solely economic
loss.' 4 ' The Northridge exception to the economic loss doctrine has been
further clarified. In Wausau Tile, the manufacturer argued that the
defective cement and aggregate that were mixed together to form the
brick pavers caused the pavers to be dangerous, and therefore a threat
to public safety. 142 In fact, a number of people who used the defective
pavers were injured. 143 However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
concluded that the Northridge exception applies only to inherently
dangerous substances, like asbestos, but does not otherwise apply to
products that may be inherently dangerous.'" The cement and
aggregate were not inherently dangerous substances, and therefore, the
dangerous pavers did not qualify under the exception.'1
5
The foregoing cases are helpful in identifying circumstances that give
rise to solely economic loss under the economic loss doctrine. Two of
the cases are examples of economic losses that stem from harm to only
the product.' 6 One case illustrates that economic loss can arise from
breach of a distributorship agreement.' 47 Six cases illustrate the various
circumstances where economic losses may arise when the defective
product damages the integrated system of which it is a part.'4 8 And
finally, there are those rare occasions where even though only economic
loss has occurred, the aggrieved party will be able to pursue tort theories
rather than contract theories because of a defendant's extraneous
140. See Northridge, 162 Wis. 2d at 923, 938, 471 N.W.2d at 180, 186.
141. Id. at 938, 471 N.W.2d at 186.
142. Wausau, 226 Wis. 2d at 260, 593 N.W.2d at 457.
143. See id. at 242 n.4, 593 N.W.2d at 449 n.4.
144. See id. at 264-65, 593 N.W.2d at 458.
145. See id. at 265, 593 N.W.2d at 459.
146. Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & Risberg, Inc., 148 Wis. 2d 910, 437
N.W.2d 213 (1989); Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 216 Wis. 2d 395, 573 N.W.2d
842 (1998).
147. Digicorp, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 2003 WI 54, T 59, 262 Wis. 2d 32, 59, 662
N.W.2d 652, 59.
148. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986); 1325 N. Van
Buren, LLC v. T-3 Group, Ltd., 2006 WI 94, 293 Wis. 2d 410, 716 N.W.2d 822; Linden v.
Cascade Stone Co., 2005 WI 113, 283 Wis. 2d 606, 699 N.W.2d 189; Wausau, 226 Wis. 2d 235,
593 N.W.2d 445; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 225 Wis. 2d 305, 592
N.W.2d 201 (1999); Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965).
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fraud '49  or because the product is an "intrinsically dangerous
substance."5 0
III. NON-ECONOMIC LOSS-"OTHER PROPERTY" DAMAGE
There is a corollary rule to the economic loss doctrine's directive
that a defective product that causes solely economic loss can be brought
only under contract law. The corollary rule is that a defective product
that causes "other property" damage may be brought as a tort action. In
a few states both theories are available.' However, in those states that
have adopted the economic loss doctrine, a choice must be made.'52 The
choice depends on the nature of the damages caused by the defective
product.'53 The purpose of this Part will be to examine the Restatement
of Torts, relevant case law, and analogous insurance law to determine
when a defective product causes non-economic loss in the form of
damage to "other property."
A. Restatement of Torts
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that "[o]ne who sells
any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm[]
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property."'5 4
In other words, there is strict tort liability when a defective product
causes damage to a person or his property. These damages are
understood to be non-economic losses. Wisconsin adopted the rule that
non-economic damages are recoverable in strict tort in Dippel v.
Sciano.'55 In Dippel, the plaintiff was permitted to recover under strict
tort for injuries he sustained when a defective pool table collapsed and
crushed his left foot.5 6 The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that his
damages were non-economic damages recoverable in tort.5 7 The tort
remedies were available notwithstanding that the plaintiff also had a
149. Wickenhauser v. Lehtinen, 2007 WI 82, 302 Wis. 2d 41, 734 N.W.2d 855; Kaloti
Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 699 N.W.2d 205.
150. Northridge Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 162 Wis. 2d 918, 471 N.W.2d 179 (1991).
151. See supra note 19 for a list of states that have not adopted the economic loss
doctrine.
152. See supra note 24 for a list of states that have adopted the economic loss doctrine.
153. E. River, 476 U.S. at 869-70.
154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
155. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 458-59, 155 N.W.2d 55, 62-63 (1967).
156. Id. at 447, 155 N.W.2d at 56.
157. Id. at 458-59, 155 N.W.2d at 62-63.
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claim under contract law. There are a number of justifications for this
rule of strict liability.158 First, the seller had undertaken and assumed a
special responsibility to any consuming member of the public to protect
that person from physical harm to his person or property. 15 9 Second, the
user has a right to expect that reputable sellers will stand behind their
product when it causes physical harm.' 6° Third, public policy demands
that the burden of accidental injuries caused by defective products be
placed upon those who place the products in the marketplace. 61 Fourth,
the cost to compensate the aggrieved user should be treated as a cost of
production to be allocated as part of the price of the product. 162 Fifth,
the seller is expected to secure liability insurance to cover the cost of
compensating aggrieved users.163 Sixth, the user of such products is
entitled to the maximum protection as the least culpable person in the
transaction. 6' And seventh, the responsibility for such damage should
be placed on the person most able to remedy future defects in the
product. 1
65
The Restatement (Third) of Torts further expands the responsibility
of a manufacturer/seller for a defective product. It provides that "[o]ne
engaged in the business of selling or ... distributing products who sells
.. a defective product" is liable to the injured party for harm caused by
the defective product to the user's person or property.' 66 Harm is
specifically defined to include economic loss if accompanied by damage
to the plaintiff's property. 67 A product can be defective in any of three
ways. It is defective if it (1) contains a manufacturing defect, (2)
contains a design defect, or (3) contains inadequate instructions or
warnings.'68 It is noteworthy that the Restatement (Third) of Torts has
not retained the unreasonably dangerous standard for manufacturing
defects. 169 The obvious intent is to expand the reach of strict liability to
all cases where the manufacturing defect causes physical harm to a
158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 402A cmt. c (1965).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1 (1998).
167. Id. § 21.
168. Id. § 2(a)-(c).
169. See id. § 2(a).
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user's person or property. This is a clear expansion of tort recovery for
non-economic losses. The unreasonably dangerous standard, however,
has been retained for design defects and inadequate instructions or
warnings. ,70
A manufacturing defect is the only one of the three defects
recognized by the Restatement (Third) of Torts that will trigger the
economic loss rule. A manufacturing defect that causes solely economic
loss triggers only contract law.1"1 A manufacturing defect that causes
non-economic loss or "other property" damage triggers tort liability.
172
The Restatement (Third) of Torts uses two illustrations to highlight the
difference between damage to only the product (economic loss) and
damage to "other property" (non-economic loss). In the first
illustration, a seller sells a conveyor belt to the buyer.'7 3 The buyer
installs the belt in its assembly line.1 7' A manufacturing defect in the
conveyor belt causes damage to the assembly line. 175 The Restatement
(Third) of Torts concludes that any losses flowing from the defective
belt are solely economic losses. 176  There is no damage to "other
property." The damage is to the product itself (the belt) and the system
(the assembly line) of which the belt is a component part. 77 In the
second illustration, the breakdown in the assembly line is caused by a
defective steering mechanism in a forklift that causes the forklift to
damage the assembly line.178 The damage in the second illustration is
clearly stated to be damage to "other property." As such, tort theories
are available to recover the damages to the forklift and assembly line as
damage to "other property" for non-economic loss.
179
There are very strong public policy reasons to require
manufacturers/sellers to be responsible for property damage caused by
their defective products. The clear impetus from the Restatement
(Second) of Torts to the Restatement (Third) of Torts has been to
require even greater accountability from manufacturers/sellers for their
defective products. Finally, the Restatement (Third) of Torts makes
170. Id. § 2(b)-(c).
171. Id. § 21 cmt. a.
172. Id.
173. Id. § 21 cmt. d, illus. 3.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. § 21 cmt. e, illus. 4.
179. Id.
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clear that there is a very discernable line between solely economic loss
and non-economic loss. Damage to the product itself or the system of
which it is a component part is solely economic loss and governed by the
economic loss doctrine. Property damage that is beyond damage to the
product itself or the system of which it is a part is damage to "other
property" or non-economic loss.
B. Case Law Defining Non-Economic Loss
1. Non-Economic Loss Recoverable Through Tort
Admittedly, it is a difficult task for courts to distinguish economic
loss from non-economic loss."'8 Economic loss occurs when a defective
product damages itself or its integrated system. Non-economic loss
occurs when a defective product damages property other than itself or its
integrated system. The theoretical distinction that has been drawn by
the courts between tort recovery for physical injury to other property
and contract recovery for economic loss is not arbitrary.' Rather the
distinction rests "on an understanding of the nature of the
responsibility" a manufacturer must assume as the cost for distributing
its product.'82 Damage to other property is considered "so akin to
personal injury that the two are treated alike."'83 A manufacturer/seller
should be held liable for physical injuries caused by his defective
product by requiring the goods to meet a standard of safety.'" A user
should not be charged with bearing the risk of physical injury simply
because he purchased a product on the market. On the other hand, a
manufacturer/seller should not be liable for a level of performance of his
product in the consumer's business unless he agreed that the product
was designed to meet the buyer's needs. 85 He should, however, be fairly
charged with the risk that his product will not satisfy the buyer's
economic expectations.'"
The leading case discussing what constitutes "other property" under
the economic loss doctrine is Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac &
180. Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 2005 WI 112, 24, 283 Wis. 2d 511, 24, 699 N.W.2d
167, 1 24.
181. Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal. 1965).
182. Id.
183. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 867 (1986).
184. Seely, 403 P.2d at 151.
185. Id.
186. Id.
1102 [91:1081
ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE
Co.' 7 In Saratoga, a defective hydraulic system caused a fire in a boat's
engine room that led to its sinking.'" The initial owner of the boat
added equipment to it after he purchased it.'89 In the subsequent
admiralty action to recover his losses, the United States Supreme Court
determined whether the subsequently added equipment was "other
property" that would permit tort theories to be asserted by the boat
owner.'9 The Court concluded that the subsequently added equipment
did qualify as "other property.''. In reaching its conclusion, the Court
highlighted a number of policy reasons for holding that the subsequently
added equipment constituted "other property." First, the Court noted
that one of the primary concerns behind tort liability for manufacturing
defects is product safety.' 92 The Court also noted that safety is obviously
an important public policy and courts should not create rules that
diminish this basic incentive, absent a justification.'93  Second, a
manufacturer/seller can bargain for tort immunity or limitation of
remedies in the event its defective product causes physical damage.9'
Thus, courts should not favor a narrow construction of what constitutes
"other property." Rather, a broader construction is more consistent
with public policy.'95 And third, even though there is overlapping
liability in contract, the ordinary rules of a manufacturer's tort liability
for a defective product should generally apply.1
96
There are a number of cases in addition to Saratoga that illustrate
when a manufacturer's defective product causes non-economic "other
property" damage. These cases are useful because they specifically
identify what constitutes "other property" damage. In Saratoga Fishing,
the United States Supreme Court held that the owner of a fishing vessel
that caught fire and sank due to a defective hydraulic system could
recover in tort for the extra skiff, nets, spare parts, and other
miscellaneous equipment on the boat.97 The Court held that the lost
187. 520 U.S. 875 (1997).
188. Id. at 877.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 881.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 882.
195. Id. at 881-82.
196. Id. at 882-83.
197. Id. at 885.
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personal property was "other property."'98  In Marshall v. Wellcraft
Marine, Inc., the owner of a yacht who was traveling on vacation began
to take on seawater during a storm. 99 The port lights in the bow of the
ship were defective, and seawater was streaming through them into the
boat.00 The water damaged the boat and the owner's personal property
within the boat. 0 ' The owner sued in tort to recover the damage to the
boat and the owner's personal property.2°2 The court held that the
action was properly brought in tort because the owner's personal
property was "other property."2 3  The owner's "other property"
consisted of their TV/VCR, a cordless drill, customized towels, canvas,
pillows, various electronics, tools, spare parts, photographs, food,
supplies, and clothing.0" The court found "other property" damage
even though there was significant economic loss. The water damage to
the yacht and its component parts was clearly economic loss, but in
conjunction with the "other property" damage the total loss became
recoverable in tort.2 5 Similarly, in A.J. Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp., a farmer suffered the loss of over 140,000 chickens when
a defective transfer switch failed to activate a back-up ventilation system
in his chicken house.26 The farmer sued in tort to recover his losses.
Maryland's highest court had to determine whether the farmer's dead
chickens constituted economic or non-economic loss. The court held
that the loss of the chickens was the loss of physical property, i.e., non-
economic loss, not economic loss.2" Thus, the farmer's tort claim was
appropriate.20
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has often stated that a product that
fails to function and causes harm to surrounding property causes harm
to "other property." 209 The court, however, has rarely found "other
198. Id. at 884.
199. 103 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1101 (S.D. Ind. 1999).
200. Id. at 1102.
201. See id. at 1103.
202. Id. at 1101.
203. See id. at 1111.
204. Id.
205. See id. at 1108.
206. 634 A.2d 1330, 1331 (Md. 1994).
207. Id. at 1334.
208. Id.
209. Wausau Tile, Inc. v. County Concrete Corp., 226 Wis. 2d 235, 249, 593 N.W.2d 445,
452 (1999) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. e (1998));
Linden v. Cascade Stone Co., 2005 WI 113, T 27,283 Wis. 2d 606, T 27, 699 N.W.2d 189, T 27
(quoting Wausau Tile, 226 Wis. 2d at 249, 593 N.W.2d at 452).
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property" damage that would permit tort liability. The only case where
the court did find "other property" damage under the economic loss
doctrine was in Northridge Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co.21 In Northridge, a
fireproofing product that contained asbestos was applied to the owner's
shopping center .21  The court held that the owner's complaint validly
stated a claim in tort because it alleged physical harm to property that
was other than the product itself."2 The alleged physical harm to the
"other property" consisted of the contamination of the owner's building
with the asbestos product."3 Today, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
would not make a finding of "other property" damage in a factual
circumstance like Northridge.1  Because the product containing
asbestos damaged the shopping center to which it was applied, the case
would fall under the integrated system rule. As such, there would be no
"other property" damage. Frankly, at this point in time, there is no case
where the Wisconsin Supreme Court has actually found "other
property" damage actionable in tort under the economic loss doctrine.
Prior to the Wisconsin Supreme Court's adoption of the economic
loss doctrine in 1989,215 the concept of a defective product damaging
"other property" had been well established in Wisconsin for nearly forty
years. In Cohan v. Associated Fur Farms, Inc., a mink farmer purchased
frozen pork livers to feed his minks." 6 The livers were purchased from a
food processor through its local distributor."7 The pork livers were
contaminated, which led to the death of a substantial number of the
farmer's minks.218 The court stated that it is well established that a
manufacturer's product that causes injury to man is actionable in tort,
but it queried whether that principle should equally apply for injury to
property.2' 9 The court concluded that there was no logical reason for
holding that one may recover for injury to his person but may not
210. 162 Wis. 2d 918, 923, 471 N.W.2d 179, 180 (1991).
211. Id. at 922, 471 N.W.2d at 180.
212. Id. at 923, 471 N.W.2d at 180.
213. Id. at 923, 471 N.W.2d at 180.
214. It is very likely that the Wisconsin Supreme Court would still permit a tort action in
the case because asbestos is an intrinsically dangerous substance. For a complete discussion
of the concept, see the earlier subsection, The Intrinsically Dangerous Substance Exception
to the Economic Loss Doctrine, supra Part II.C.2.b.
215. Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & Risberg, Inc., 148 Wis. 2d 910, 916,
437 N.W.2d 213,215 (1989).
216. 261 Wis. 584, 587, 53 N.W.2d 788, 790 (1952).
217. Id. at 587, 53 N.W.2d at 790.
218. Id. at 588, 53 N.W.2d at 790.
219. Id. at 591-92, 53 N.W.2d at 791-92.
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recover for injury to his property.220 The court held that tort liability
should extend to property damage in all cases where a causal connection
can be established between the defective product and the property
damage.22' The dead minks were clearly property damage stemming
from the contaminated food, and as such, the non-economic loss was
recoverable in tort. Although Cohan pre-dates the adoption of the
economic loss doctrine, it should be understood as controlling precedent
on what qualifies as non-economic loss unless the court indicates
otherwise.
2. Non-Economic Loss Recoverable Through Contract Law
In general, when a defective product causes "other property"
damage or non-economic loss, the aggrieved party can seek to recover
through tort. The public policy of encouraging manufacturers/sellers to
deal in safer products justifies tort accountability. There are, however,
some exceptions to the general rule. One exception is where the non-
economic loss is so de minimis that the public policy encouraging safer
products is so marginally involved as to not require tort involvement.
The second exception is where the non-economic loss was a foreseeable
loss and could have been the subject of negotiations between the
contracting parties. Both are discussed in the following sections.
a. De Minimis Non-Economic Loss
When a product fails or is defective, the buyer suffers a loss of
product value and associated expenses. These losses are understood to
be economic losses and recoverable through contract law. In those cases
where the product fails or is defective and "other property" damage
occurs, both economic and non-economic losses are suffered. The fact
that "other property" damage has occurred means that the plaintiff can
pursue tort theories to recover both its economic and non-economic
losses.222 But if the buyer has suffered only a nominal amount of non-
economic losses in conjunction with the economic losses, should tort
theories be available?
There are only a few cases that address this issue. The
220. Id. at 591-92, 53 N.W.2d at 792.
221. See id. at 591, 53 N.W.2d at 792 (quoting Marsh Wood Prods. Co. v Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209, 226, 240 N.W. 392, 399 (1932)).
222. Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 216 Wis. 2d 395, 401-02, 573 N.W.2d
842, 845 (1998); see also Northridge Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 162 Wis. 2d 918, 923, 471
N.W.2d 179, 180 (1991); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21 (1998).
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determination whether sufficient "other property" has been damaged to
sustain an action in tort is very fact intensive. The clearest case that
made a finding of de minimis "other property" damage is Veeder v. NC
Machinery Co. 23 In Veeder, the buyer purchased a ship that was made
according to his specifications.22 ' A problem developed with the ship's
engine. When the engine malfunctioned, it sprayed engine oil on
adjacent personal property.225 The court held that the "other property"
damage was de minimis .1 6  Because the oil spray was on cleanable
surfaces, the court concluded that the losses suffered were only
economic losses. 227 In Rich Products Corp. v. Kemutec, Inc., a buyer
purchased a mechanical conveyor to be used in the production of its
food products.228 Unfortunately, the conveyor's wires frayed and wire
strands were found in the buyer's food products. 229 The buyer suffered
eleven million dollars in damages as a result of the recall of its food
products."0 The court noted that the food products were damaged
"other property" under the economic loss doctrine. 3' However, the
court identified the issue as "how much 'other property' must be
damaged in order to take a case outside the economic loss rule., 23 2 The
evidence indicated that twenty-nine pieces of wire were found over an
eleven to twelve month period during which six million cases of product
were processed .33  Each case had twelve to twenty-four individual
products.21 The court concluded that the dispute involved only minimal
damage to "other property" and thus, was primarily about economic
lOSS.235 Both Veeder and Rich Products indicate that nominal, almost
imperceptible property damage is not sufficient to engage tort theories
for recovery. The results seem sensible because safety concerns
engender tort theories, and in both cases the safety concerns were very
minimal.
However, in Winchester v. Lester's of Minnesota, Inc., the non-
223. 720 F. Supp. 847 (W.D. Wash. 1989).
224. See id. at 848.
225. Id. at 853.
226. Id.
227. See id.
228. 66 F. Supp. 2d 937, 943 (E.D. Wis. 1999)
229. Id. at 951-52.
230. Id. at 952.
231. Id. at 970.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 971.
234. Id.
235. See id. at 971-72.
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economic "other property" damage was more than nominal.236  In
Winchester, a hog farmer contracted with the defendant to design,
manufacture, and construct a hog house on the plaintiff's farm." The
defendant constructed the hog house, and almost immediately, the
farmer began experiencing ventilation problems in the hog house."8 As
a result of the defective ventilation, the damages suffered by the farmer
included extra labor, dead hogs, losses due to underweight hogs, extra
veterinary bills, lost profits, and costs to correct the ventilation system.239
The Tenth Circuit phrased the issue as whether the damages should be
characterized as tort (non-economic) or contract (economic) damages."4
The district court held that all the damages with the exception of the
costs to correct the ventilation system were non-economic "other
property" damages.24' The Tenth Circuit disagreed 22 The district court
stated that the farmer's loss of hogs due to the poor ventilation was
unquestionably "other property" damage due to the failure of the hog
house.243 However, on balance, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the
essence of their claim was contractual in nature and as such should be
treated as economic loss.244 The coincident and material "other
property" non-economic damages were not sufficient to engender tort
241theories.
On the other side of the ledger is Marshall v. Wellcraft Marine, Inc.248
In Marshall, the bow lights on a yacht were defective causing water to
infiltrate the ship. 247 The sea water damaged the ship and the owners'
personal property. The ship damage was to the engine compartment,
the galley, and the ship's navigational and communication devices. 9
236. See 983 F.2d 992, 994 (10th Cir. 1993).
237. Id. at 993.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 994.
240. Id. at 995.
241. See id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 996.
244. Id.
245. Another interpretation (although not expressed) is that the court was using the
disappointed performance expectations rule in which "other property" damage is not
actionable under tort law. See infra Part III.B.2.b for a basic explanation of the disappointed
performance expectations test adopted in Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 2005 WI 112, 283 Wis.
2d 511, 699 N.W.2d 167.
246. 103 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (S.D. Ind. 1999).
247. Id. at 1102.
248. Id. at 1101.
249. Id. at 1102.
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The owners estimated their property damages to be $40,000 for yacht
repairs, $18,000 for electronics, $5,000 for their lost and damaged
personal property, $9,000 for lost use of the vessel, and $400 for out-of-
pocket expenses.2  The owners sought recovery of their damages
through tort theories. The defendant opposed the plaintiffs' tort claims
on the basis that their "other property" damage was de minimis, thereby
precluding tort theories.21' The court held that even though there was
significant economic loss suffered by the owners, the court did not
regard their loss of personal property, totaling in the thousands of
dollars, to be de minimis on its face.5 2 The owners were permitted to
pursue their economic and non-economic losses through tort theories.253
b. Significant Non-Economic Loss
There exists a line of thought that argues that if a defective product
causes property damage, but the property damage is the result of the
disappointed expectations of a product's performance, then the damages
are pure economic loss. As a result, only contract remedies are
available to recover one's losses. The doctrine is known as the
disappointed performance expectations test,2  and it applies even
though the damage suffered by the plaintiff is to "other property,"
which would normally permit tort remedies. 255 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court adopted the disappointed performance expectations test in Grams
v. Milk Products, Inc.256 In Grams, a farmer fed his calves a non-
medicated milk substitute purchased from a supplier.257 The milk
replacer damaged the calves' immune systems, thereby causing
inadequate growth and an increased mortality rate.58 The farmer sued
to recover his losses through contract and tort theories.2 9 The court
framed the issue as determining whether the Grams' tort claims were
barred by the economic loss doctrine.2'6 The court acknowledged that
250. Id. at 1103.
251. Id. at 1105.
252. Id. at 1111 n.7.
253. Id. at 1108.
254. See Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 2005 WI 112, I 3, 283 Wis. 2d 511, 3, 699 N.W.2d
167, T 3.
255. Id. 3,283 Wis. 2d 511, 3,699 N.W.2d 167, T 3.
256. Id. 31,283 Wis. 2d 511, T 31,699 N.W.2d 167, T 31.
257. Id. 7, 283 Wis. 2d 511, T 7, 699 N.W.2d 167, 7.
258. Id. 8, 283 Wis. 2d 511, T 8, 699 N.W.2d 167, T1 8.
259. Id. T 9,283 Wis. 2d 511, 9,699 N.W.2d 167, T 9.
260. Id. 11,283 Wis. 2d 511, 11,699 N.W.2d 167, T 11.
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the milk replacer's damage to the calves' immune systems was property
damage. 61 It is unclear, however, whether the acknowledged property
damage qualified as "other property" damage as understood in the
Restatement (Third) of Torts and existing case law.262 The Decoster
case, for example, clearly held that a defective product that killed
thousands of chickens caused "other property" damage. More
importantly, the Wisconsin precedent established in Cohan was that
feeding contaminated food to animals that results in their malnutrition
and death is damage to "other property" and thus actionable in tort.26
Unquestionably, the milk replacer's damage to the calves' immune
systems in Grams constitutes "other property" damage that would
generally trigger tort liability. Clearly, the "other property" damage was
very significant, unlike the de minimis "other damage" in the preceding
section. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the "other property"
damage was the result of the farmer's disappointed expectations for the
milk replacer, and as such, the economic loss doctrine barred the
plaintiff's tort claims.265 The farmer was permitted to pursue only his
contract remedies. The unfortunate effect of the disappointed
expectations test is to convert significant non-economic loss into
economic loss that allows only contract liability.26
C. Insurance Law
For many years, insurance liability law has been distinguishing
economic loss from non-economic loss or "other property" damage. In
fact, the rule developed in insurance liability law is unambiguous and
has been relatively easy for the courts to apply. Very simply, property
damage occurs under insurance liability law when there has been
"physical injury to tangible property., 267 With one modification, this
definition should be borrowed from insurance law and adopted by
Wisconsin courts when distinguishing economic loss from non-economic
261. Id. 31, 283 Wis. 2d 511, J 31, 699 N.W.2d 167, $ 31.
262. Id. 1[ 44-45, 283 Wis. 2d 511, T 44-45, 699 N.W.2d 167, 44-45.
263. A.J. Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 634 A.2d 1330, 1334 (Md. 1994).
264. Cohan v. Associated Fur Farms, Inc., 261 Wis. 584, 591, 53 N.W.2d 788, 792 (1952).
265. Grams, 2005 WI 112, 3,283 Wis. 2d 511, 3,699 N.W.2d 167, T 3.
266. Although examination of the disappointed expectations test is beyond the scope of
this Article, it will be the subject of the author's next article.
267. Wis. Label Corp. v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2000 WI 26, $ 30, 233 Wis.
2d 314, 30, 607 N.W.2d 276, 30; Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 2004 WI 2,
T 5, 268 Wis. 2d 16, 5, 673 N.W.2d 65, J 5; see also Vogel v. Russo, 2000 WI 85, 19, 236
Wis. 2d 504, $ 19, 613 N.W.2d 177, $ 19.
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loss under the economic loss doctrine.
In 1940, the insurance industry first promulgated its standard
commercial general liability policy.26 Commercial general liability
policies are designed to protect the insured from losses arising out of
one's business operations. 269  There are generally two types of risks
associated with a business: 270 those risks that arise out of a business
operation that are tortious in nature, and those risks that arise from the
business not performing on its contractual obligations.27" ' An example of
the former would be a defective product that causes personal injury or
property damage. 2" An example of the latter would be a defective
product that fails to function according to its warranties.273 Under
insurance law, this latter group, which is contractual in nature, is called
the business risk exclusion.274 Generally, when a business fails to
perform in accordance with its contractual obligation the claimant may
seek to recover for breach of contract damages. These business risks are
not covered by a comprehensive general liability policy and are
normally expressed as exclusions from the general coverage of the
policy. Thus, a commercial general liability policy with its business risk
exclusion is designed to provide coverage for tort liability for personal
injury or physical damage to others. The policy is not for contractual
liability of the insured for economic loss caused because the product did
not perform according to its warranties.275
A commercial general liability policy has two primary parts. The
268. Wis. Label Corp., 2000 WI 26, 27 n.3, 233 Wis. 2d 314, 27 n.3, 607 N.W.2d 276,
J 27 n.3.
269. Id. $1 27, 233 Wis. 2d. 314, 91 27, 607 N.W.2d 276, 1 27.
270. See Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 405 A.2d 788, 791 (N.J. 1979).
271. See Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Lynne, 686 N.W.2d 118, 124 (N.D. 2004);
McGowan v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 100 P.3d 521, 524-25 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004); Custom
Planning & Dev., Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 606 S.E.2d 39, 42 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004); Jim
Barna Log Sys. Midwest, Inc. v. Gen. Cas. Ins. Co. of Wis., 791 N.E.2d 816, 823-24 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2003).
272. See Kemp v. Miller, 154 Wis. 2d 538, 544-45, 453 N.W.2d 872, 873-74 (1990);
Ransome v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 87 Wis. 2d 605, 619-20, 275 N.W.2d 641, 647-48 (1979).
273. See Trio's, Inc. v. Jones Sign Co., 151 Wis. 2d 380, 384-85, 444 N.W.2d 443, 444-45
(Ct. App. 1989); B&D Contractors, Inc. v. Arwin Window Sys., Inc., 2006 WI App 123, T 7,
294 Wis. 2d 378, 1 7, 718 N.W.2d 256, 91 7.
274. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 2004 WI 2, $ 28, 268 Wis. 2d 16, 28,
673 N.W.2d 65, $1 28.
275. Grinnell, 686 N.W.2d at 124; Wis. Label Corp. v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,
2000 WI 26, T1 27, 233 Wis. 2d 314, 9 27, 607 N.W.2d 276, 1 27; Jim Barna, 791 N.E.2d at 823-
24; Newark Ins. Co. v. Acupac Packaging, Inc., 746 A.2d 47, 50-51 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2000); Bonded Concrete, Inc. v. Transcon. Ins. Co., 784 N.Y.S.2d 212, 213 (N.Y. App. Div.
2004).
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first part is the insuring clause which sets forth the specific risks covered
by the policy. The second part is the exclusions clause which removes
coverage for risks that would otherwise fall within the coverage of the
insuring clause. Together they define the actual coverage of the policy.
Commercial general liability policies typically provide coverage for
"bodily injury" and "property damage" that is the result of an
'occurrence." The majority of jurisdictions conclude that a breach of
contract is almost never an "occurrence" covered by a commercial
liability policy.276 Wisconsin does not strictly adhere to that general rule.
In Wisconsin, a breach of contract claim may be an "occurrence," but
the claim may also be excluded depending upon the scope of the policy's
exclusions. On at least one occasion, a breach of contract claim was
held to be covered by a commercial general liability policy.277 In
general, however, a commercial general liability policy is designed and
intended to provide coverage to the insured for tort liability for physical
injury to the person or property of others.278 A commercial general
liability policy is not intended to provide coverage for the insured's
contractual liability which covers solely economic lOSS. 27 9 In order to
provide coverage for tort liability and exclude coverage for contract
liability, a number of "business risk" exclusions 28 ° are included within
276. Lenning v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 574, 582 (6th Cir. 2001); Pace
Constr. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 177, 180 (8th Cir. 1991); Keystone Filler &
Mfg. Co. v. Am. Mining Ins. Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 432, 439-40 (M.D. Pa. 2002); Twin City Fire
Ins. Co. v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 124 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1248 (M.D. Ala. 2000); U.S.
Fire Ins. Co. v. Milton Co., 35 F. Supp. 2d 83, 86 (D.D.C. 1998); Gibson & Assocs., Inc. v.
Home Ins. Co., 966 F. Supp. 468, 474 (N.D. Tex. 1997); Koch Eng'g Co. v. Gibraltar Cas. Co.,
878 F. Supp. 1286, 1288-89 (E.D. Mo. 1995); Md. Cas. Co. v. Mike Miller Cos., 715 F. Supp.
321, 322 (D. Kan. 1989); Yegge v. Integrity Mut. Ins. Co., 534 N.W.2d 100, 102-03 (Iowa
1995); Action Ads, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 685 P.2d 42, 43-44 (Wyo. 1984); Union Ins. Co.
v. Hottenstein, 83 P.3d 1196, 1201-02 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003); Am. States Ins. Co. v. Mathis,
974 S.W.2d 647, 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); Kvaerner Metals Div. of Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v.
Commercial Union Ins. Co., 825 A.2d 641, 650-51 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
277. Am. Family, 2004 WI 2, 5, 268 Wis. 2d 16, 1 5, 673 N.W.2d 65, 5. In American
Family, a breach of contract claim was deemed an "occurrence" because of an exception to
the business risks exclusions with the net result of placing the contract claim with the
definition of an "occurrence." Id.
278. Custom Planning & Dev., Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 606 S.E.2d 39, 42 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2004); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tillerson, 777 N.E.2d 986, 992 (11. Ct. App. 2002);
Weedo v. Stone-E Brick, Inc., 405 A.2d 788, 791 (N.J. 1979); Isle of Palms Pest Control Co. v.
Monticello Ins. Co., 459 S.E.2d 318, 320 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994).
279. Bulen v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 125 Wis. 2d 259, 264-65, 371 N.W.2d 392, 394-95
(Ct. App. 1985); see also Custom Planning, 606 S.E.2d at 42; State Farm, 777 N.E.2d at 992;
Weedo, 405 A.2d at 791; Isle of Palms, 459 S.E.2d at 320.
280. The primary business risk exclusions are known as "your work," "your product,"
and "your property." See ERIC MILLS HOLMES, HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE
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the standard commercial general liability policy. These exist for the
express purpose of excluding coverage for risks that relate to the repair
or replacement of the insured's faulty work or products, or defects in the
insured's work or products themselves. 28' These "business risk"
exclusions are designed to provide coverage for tort liability only, and
not for the contractual liability of the insured for economic losses that
occur because the product or completed work was not what the other
party bargained for.282
A commercial general liability policy with its standard business risk
exclusions provides insurers coverage for "property damage" that is
tortious in nature, not contractual. The standard commercial general
liability policy defines "property damage" in part as "[p]hysical injury to
tangible property., 283  This definition is understood to mean that
property suffers physical, tangible injury when it is altered in
appearance, shape, color, or in some other material fashion. 281 It is
important to note that insurance law does not follow the integrated
system rule that has been adopted as part of the economic loss doctrine.
Nevertheless, insurance cases are very useful in determining what
constitutes "physical injury to tangible property." In other words, a
defective component integrated into a final product that damages any
part of the final product is considered "property damage" under
insurance law.285  On the other hand, tangible property does not
experience physical injury if the property suffers only economic loss. 286
Pure economic losses, such as loss of business, loss of goodwill, loss of
profits, loss of investment, and diminution in value, are not property
damage under a commercial general liability policy.2' Additionally, the
§ 132.9 (2d. ed. 2002 & Supp. 2007).
281. Am. Family, 2004 WI 2, 29, 268 Wis. 2d 16, T[ 29, 673 N.W.2d 65, 91 29; Grinnell
Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Lynne, 686 N.W.2d 118, 124 (N.D. 2004); Tolomeo v. Emanuelson,
No. 04-C-0486, 2005 WL 1629900, at *3 (E.D. Wis. July 7, 2005); Weedo, 405 A.2d at 791;
Bulen, 125 Wis. 2d at 261, 371 N.W.2d at 394.
282. See Am. Family, 2004 WI 2, T 28-29, 268 Wis. 2d 16, TT 28-29, 673 N.W.2d 65,
TT91 28-29; Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Kenway Contracting, Inc., 240 S.W.3d 633, 640 (Ky.
2007); Grinnell, 686 N.W.2d at 124; Weedo, 405 A.2d at 791; Bulen, 125 Wis. 2d at 261, 371
N.W.2d at 393.
283. Wis. Label Corp. v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2000 WI 26, 9 10, 233 Wis.
2d 314, T1 10, 607 N.W.2d 276, T1 10.
284. Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Eljer Mfg., Inc., 757 N.E.2d 481, 496 (I11. 2001); United Nat'l
Ins. Co. v. Frontier Ins. Co., 99 P.3d 1153, 1159 (Nev. 2004) (quoting Traveler's, 757 N.E.2d at
496).
285. HOLMES, supra note 280, § 129.2.
286. Traveler's, 757 N.E.2d at 496; United Nat'l Ins., 99 P.3d at 1159.
287. Am. States Ins. Co. v. Martin, 662 So. 2d 245, 248-49 (Ala. 1995); Nova Cas. Co. v.
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failure of a product to perform as intended does not give rise to
property damage.2" Finally, the costs to repair or replace a defective
product or defective work are not property damage under a commercial
general liability policy.
289
Wisconsin has a long history of interpreting commercial general
liability policies where "property damage" is defined as "physical injury
to tangible property." A common interpretation issue under
commercial general liability policies is whether the claimed loss is
property damage or economic loss. A leading case in Wisconsin
discussing the distinction between "property damage" and economic
loss is Wisconsin Label Corp. v. Northbrook Property & Casualty
Insurance Co. 290 In Wisconsin Label, a subsidiary of Wisconsin Label
mislabeled certain products that caused the products to be sold for less
then half of their intended retail price. 91 Subsequently, Wisconsin
Label was forced to pay the retailer for its losses.292  Thereafter,
Wisconsin Label notified its insurer of its intention to seek recovery for
the losses under its commercial general liability policy. The insurer
informed Wisconsin Label that the policy did not provide coverage
because no "property damage" had occurred under the policy 9
"Property damage" was defined in the policy as "[p]hysical injury to
tangible property., 294 The Wisconsin Supreme Court defined the issue
to be whether the mislabeling qualified as damage from "physical injury
to tangible property." 295 Importantly, the supreme court noted that this
Able Constr. Inc., 983 P.2d 575, 581 (Utah 1999); F & H Constr. v. ITT Hartford Ins. Co. of
the Midwest, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 896, 901 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); Giddings v. Indus. Indem. Co.,
169 Cal. Rptr. 278, 281 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); Lamar Truck Plaza, Inc. v. Sentry Ins., 757 P.2d
1143, 1144 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Ludwig Candy Co. v. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 396 N.E.2d
1329, 1332 (Ill. Ct. App. 1979); Bush v. Shoemaker-Beal, 987 P.2d 1103, 1105 (Kan. Ct. App.
1999); Houston Petroleum Co. v. Highlands Ins. Co., 830 S.W.2d 153, 156 (Tex. App. 1990).
288. F & H Constr., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 901.
289. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Penda Corp., 974 F.2d 823, 831 (7th Cir. 1992); U.S. Fire Ins.
Co. v. Milton Co., 35 F. Supp. 2d 83, 86 (D.D.C. 1998); Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Tripp
Constr., Inc., 737 So. 2d 600, 601 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Amerisure, Inc. v. Wurster
Constr. Co., 818 N.E.2d 998, 1003-04 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); Assurance Co. of Am. v. Dusel
Builders, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 607, 609 (W.D. Ky. 1999); George A. Fuller Co. v. U.S. Fid. &
Guar. Co., 613 N.Y.S.2d 152, 155 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); Prod. Sys., Inc. v. Amerisure Ins.
Co., 605 S.E.2d 663,666 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004); Wm. C. Vick Constr. Co. v. Pa. Nat'l Mut. Cas.
Ins. Co., 52 F. Supp. 2d 569, 582 (E.D.N.C. 1999).
290. 2000 WI 26, 233 Wis. 2d 314, 607 N.W.2d 276.
291. Id. 8, 233 Wis. 2d 314, 8, 607 N.W.2d 276, 8.
292. Id. 2, 233 Wis. 2d 314, 2, 607 N.W.2d 276, 2.
293. Id. 3, 233 Wis. 2d 314, 3, 607 N.W.2d 276, 3.
294. Id. 1 10, 233 Wis. 2d 314, 10, 607 N.W.2d 276, 10.
295. Id. 30, 233 Wis. 2d 314, T 30, 607 N.W.2d 276, % 30.
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standard definition of property damage is unambiguous.296 The court
reasoned that the word injury standing alone may refer to both physical
and non-physical damage, but when it is qualified by "physical," it
requires physical damage to qualify as property damage. 27 The court
concluded that no physical damage occurred as a result of the
mislabeling. 298  The court reasoned that while the products were
improperly labeled, the product remained physically undamaged at all
times.29 The lack of physical damage was demonstrated by the fact that
the products were sold to customers with the improper labeling. The
court did, however, indicate that mislabeling could cause physical injury
to a product if, for example, a caustic adhesive in the label burned the
product."°  But that did not occur in this case. The insured further
argued that there was clearly physical injury because the mislabeling
required a physical repair." ' The court noted that the repair required to
remedy Wisconsin Label's defective workmanship was inspection and
relabeling as opposed to any physical repair to the products.30 2 The
court reasoned that the economic losses that resulted were not due to
"physical injury" to the products but due to Wisconsin Label's failure to
complete its work under its contract.30 3 Therefore, the economic losses
suffered as a result of Wisconsin Label's breach of contract were not
property damage. Thus, there was no coverage under the commercial
general liability policy. On the other hand, where there is physical
injury to the tangible property of another, there is property damage
under a commercial general liability policy.
3
The standard commercial general liability policy defines property
damage as "physical injury to tangible property." Courts have had little
difficulty applying this definition when determining whether property
damage has occurred under a commercial general liability policy.
Under the economic loss doctrine, however, property damage requires
that courts also incorporate the integrated system rule. In fact, the
296. Id. 31, 233 Wis. 2d 314, 31, 607 N.W.2d 276, 31.
297. Id. 1 31, 233 Wis. 2d 314, 31, 607 N.W.2d 276, 31.
298. Id. 1 32, 233 Wis. 2d 314, 32, 607 N.W.2d 276, 32.
299. Id. 32, 233 Wis. 2d 314, J 32, 607 N.W.2d 276, qT 32.
300. Id. J[ 32, 233 Wis. 2d 314, T1 32, 607 N.W.2d 276, 32.
301. Id. 33, 233 Wis. 2d 314, 33, 607 N.W.2d 276, [ 33.
302. Id. T1 33, 233 Wis. 2d 314, T 33, 607 N.W.2d 276, 1 33.
303. Id. 9T 33, 233 Wis. 2d 314, T1 33, 607 N.W.2d 276, 1 33.
304. Robert E. Lee & Assocs. v. Peters, 206 Wis. 2d 509, 523, 557 N.W.2d 457, 463 (Ct.
App. 1996); Nor-Lake, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 201 Wis. 2d 816, 549 N.W.2d 286 (Ct.
App. 1996) (unpublished opinion).
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insurance definition of property damage, without modification, was the
"bright-line rule" rejected by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Grams."5
But by incorporating the integrated system rule into the insurance law
definition, a very user-friendly and sensible rule is created for the courts.
The proposed rule is that non-economic loss occurs when a defective
product causes "physical injury to tangible property other than the
product itself or its integrated system." The corollary rule is that
economic loss occurs when a defective product causes "physical injury to
the product itself or its integrated system." There is some indication in
Wisconsin Supreme Court jurisprudence that such a rule and its
corollary may be acceptable.3' 6
IV. CONCLUSION
The essence of the economic loss doctrine is that economic losses are
resolved under contract law and non-economic losses are resolved under
tort law. Unfortunately, it is difficult to distinguish economic loss from
non-economic loss. An examination, however, of the U.C.C., the
Restatement (Second) and Restatement (Third) of Torts, and relevant
case law yields user-friendly and defensible definitions for those facing
the contract/tort decision mandated by the economic loss doctrine.
The U.C.C. clearly recognizes and defines three types of economic
losses. The first is loss of product value that occurs when a product fails
to meet its contractual promises/warranties. A second is expenses that
are incidental to the breach of contract. The third is consequential
damages, in the absence of property damage that are the result of a
product's failed performance. The Restatement (Third) of Torts
recognizes economic loss damage as damage to the product itself or its
integrated system. Case law confirms that economic loss includes loss of
product value; consequential damages, in the absence of property
damage, that flow from the breach; and property damage to the product
itself or its integrated system. The economic loss doctrine mandates that
all of these economic losses are recoverable only through contract law,
not tort law. There are, however, two recognized exceptions to the
305. Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 2005 WI 112, IT 43-44, 283 Wis. 2d 511, 43-44, 699
N.W.2d 167, I 43-44.
306. Justice Abrahamson's dissent in Grams v. Milk Products, Inc., 2005 WI 112, 76-
78, 283 Wis. 2d 511, I 76-78, 699 N.W.2d 167, 76-78, hypothesizes a defective garage
door opener that unexpectedly closes on an owner's car, or a defective car that unexpectedly
shifts into reverse and damages the garage door. Id. In both cases, the justice believes the
court would consider those damages to be non-economic loss damages recoverable in tort.
Id.
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economic loss doctrine where solely economic losses are recoverable in
tort. One is where the contract was induced by a party's extraneous
fraud, and the other is where the product contains an intrinsically
dangerous substance.
Unlike economic loss, non-economic loss is recoverable in tort. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts indicates that there are numerous,
strong policy reasons to permit non-economic loss to be recovered
through tort law. The policy reasons are primarily based on safety
concerns and appropriate risk allocations. The Restatement (Third) of
Torts has further expanded tort liability for non-economic loss by
deleting the unreasonably dangerous standard for products with
manufacturing defects. This expresses an important policy statement
that, in case of doubt, courts should favor tort coverage over contract
coverage. In virtually every circumstance where a defective product
causes non-economic loss, economic loss will also be present. In such a
case, tort law is available to recoup both losses. There are, however,
two circumstances where non-economic loss is not recoverable in tort.
The first is where the non-economic loss is too de minimis to engage tort
concerns. The second is where the non-economic loss is considered to
be the result of the product's disappointed performance. Finally, cases
decided under commercial general liability policies are helpful in
distinguishing economic loss from non-economic loss. The standard
policy defines property damage as "physical injury to tangible
property." This is admittedly an unambiguous definition that proves
useful when joined with the integrated system rule.
In conclusion, a defensible and understandable definition of
economic loss can be assembled from the various sources. Economic
loss as understood under the economic loss doctrine includes (1) loss of
product value due to the product's failure to meet its contractual
promises or warranties; (2) physical injury to the product itself or its
integrated system; and (3) any incidental or consequential damages that
flow from (1) or (2). Non-economic loss, of course, is any loss that is
other than described above.
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